<!-- citation-library:start --> ## Citation reference Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 306 Cal.Rptr.3d 241 > [!info] Working notes > This is a personal working note. Citation details are for reference; opinion and current-status verification may still be pending. <!-- citation-library:end --> ![[Files/CaseFiles/D080578.PDF]] [Opinion PDF](https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/D080578.PDF) ## Rule excerpts Family Code sections 217, 3422, and 3423; relevance was not specifically explained and the material facts were undisputed. Second excerpt quotes In re Marriage of Nurie (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 478, 500-501. > Even without a finding of good cause, the court is required to receive live testimony under section 217 only if that testimony is “relevant and within the scope of the hearing.” (Id., subd. (a).) But Fishbein failed to explain with specificity, either in the trial court below or in his briefing on appeal, how cross-examining Segal about her declaration would have related to the issues underlying the California court’s jurisdictional ruling. — Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, slip op., p. 18. > Further, Fishbein’s theory fails for yet another reason: section 3422 and section 3423’s plain language is clear that a judicial determination that all parties no longer resided in Virginia was required before Virginia could “lose” its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. (Nurie, supra, 176 Cal.App.4th at p. 500.) “It is not the parties’ departure itself that terminates the decree state’s exclusive, continuing jurisdiction. Rather, it is when a ‘court . . . determines’ that all parties have ceased residing there that jurisdiction is lost.” (Id. at pp. 500–501; § 3422, subd. (a)(2), § 3423, subd. (b).) Without such a finding in either California or Virginia, “the statutory condition terminating jurisdiction simply ha[d] not occurred.” (Nurie, at p. 501.) — Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, slip op., p. 15.