<!-- citation-library:start --> ## Citation reference Kouvabina & Veltman, In re Marriage of (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 293 > [!info] Working notes > This is a personal working note. Citation details are for reference; opinion and current-status verification may still be pending. <!-- citation-library:end --> ![[Files/CaseFiles/A171807.PDF]] [Opinion PDF](https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/A171807.PDF) ## Rule excerpts Code of Civil Procedure section 391(b)(1); the second excerpt quotes Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 402, 406–407 and footnote 5. > The Legislature could have exempted family law matters — as it exempted small claims actions in section 391(b)(1) — but it did not. To the contrary, Family Code section 210 explicitly provides that the vexatious litigant statutes apply to family law proceedings. In sum, there is no reason to think the vexatious litigant statutes apply to family law matters with lesser or different force. — In re Marriage of Kouvabina & Veltman (2025), slip op., p. 9. > Her appeal from a specific order has been finally determined adversely to her — within the meaning of section 391(b)(1) — once she has lost and all “avenues for direct review (appeal) have been exhausted or the time for appeal has expired.” (Garcia v. Lacey, supra, 231 Cal.App.4th at pp. 406–407 & fn. 5.) That she could — in the future — request a new order modifying support based on a material change in circumstances does not render previously issued orders — or appeals therefrom — nonfinal for purposes of the vexatious litigant statutes. — In re Marriage of Kouvabina & Veltman (2025), slip op., p. 11.