<!-- citation-library:start --> ## Citation reference Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 321 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 24 > [!info] Working notes > This is a personal working note. Citation details are for reference; opinion and current-status verification may still be pending. <!-- citation-library:end --> ![[Files/CaseFiles/H049873.PDF]] [Opinion PDF](https://www.courts.ca.gov/opinions/archive/H049873.PDF) ## Rule excerpts Anti-SLAPP review of a DVRO petition; Civil Code section 47(b). The court rejected a categorical DVPA exception and assessed the privilege on these particular facts. > Robert appears to argue that any e-mails that constitute protected conduct are not privileged because they constitute abuse under the DVPA. We disagree with this statement as a general principle of law. The statutory authority for issuance of a domestic violence restraining order under the DVPA does not generally present an “irreconcilable conflict[]” with the litigation privilege. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1247.) Nor does there appear to be any categorical exclusion from the litigation privilege for domestic violence restraining order claims. Nevertheless, we agree with Robert that the litigation privilege does not apply on these facts. — Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, slip op., p. 22. > Because Robert’s DVRO petition is based in part on communications related to Susan’s anticipated legal action and in large part on other, unprotected e-mails, application of the privilege would render the DVPA “significantly or wholly inoperable,” were its enforcement barred in these circumstances. (Action Apartment, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1246.) Accordingly, we conclude that under the facts presented, the litigation privilege does not bar Robert’s petition for DVRO. — Bassi v. Bassi (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1080, slip op., p. 24.